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LIMINAL TO LIMINOID, IN PLAY, FLOW, AND 
RITUAL: AN ESSAY IN COMPARATIVE SYMBOLOGY 
by Victor Turner 
First I will describe what 1 mean by "comparative symbology" and how, 
in a broad way, it differs from such disciplines as "semiotics" (or "semiology") 
and "symbolic anthropology," which are also concerned with the study of 
such terms as symbols, signs, signals, significations, icons, signifiers, signi- 
f ied~,  sign-vehicles, and so on. Here, I want to discuss some of the types of 
sociocultural processes and settings in which new symbols, verbal and non- 
verbal, tend to be generated. This will lead me into a comparison of "liminal" 
and "liminoid" phenomena, terms which 1 will consider shortly. 
According to Josiah Webster's lexicographical progeny, the people who 
produced the second College edition of Webster's New World Dictionary, 
"symbology" is "the study or interpretation of symbols"; it is also "repre- 
sentation or expression by means of symbols." The term "comparative" 
merely means that this branch of study involves comparison as a method, 
as does, for example, comparative linguistics. Comparative symbology is 
narrower than "semiotics" or "semiology" (to use Saussure's and Roland 
Barthes's terms), and wider than "symbolic anthropology" in range and 
scope of data and problems. "Semiotics" is "a general theory of signs and 
symbols, especially, the analysis of the nature and relationship of signs in 
language, usually including three branches, syntactics, semantics, and 
pragmatics." 
1) Syntactics: The formal relationships of signs and symbols to one an- 
other apart from their users or external reference; the organization and 
relationship of groups, phrases, clauses, sentences, and sentence structure. 
2)Semantics: The relationship of signs and symbols to the things to 
which they refer, that is, their referential meaning. 
3) Pragmatics: The relations of signs and symbols with their users. 
In my own analyses of ritual symbols, "syntactics" is roughly similar to 
what I call "positional meaning"; "semantics" is similar to "exegetical 
meaning"; and "pragmatics" is similar to "operational meaning." Semiology 
seems to have rather wider aspirations than semiotics, since it is defined as 
"the science of signs in general" whereas semiotics restricts itself to signs 
in language, though Roland Barthes is now taking the position that "lin- 
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guistics is not a part of the general science of signs . . . it is semiology which 
is a part of linguistics" (Barthes 1967: 1 I ) .  
Comparative symbology is not directly concerned with the technical 
aspects of linguistics, and has much to do with many kinds of nonverbal 
symbols in ritual and art, though admittedly all cultural languages have 
important linguistic components, relays, or "signifieds." Nevertheless, it is 
involved in the relationships between symbols and the concepts, feelings, 
values, notions, etc., associated with them by users, interpreters, or exegetes: 
in short it has semantic dimensions, it pertains to meaning in language and 
context. Its data are mainly drawn from cultural genres or subs~vsrems of 
expressive culture. These include both oral and literate genres, and one may 
reckon among them activities combining verbal and nonverbal symbolic 
actions, such as ritual and drama, as well as narrative genres, such as myth, 
epic, ballad, the novel and ideological systems. They would also include 
nonverbal forms, such as miming, sculpture, painting, music, ballet, and 
architecture-and many more. 
But comparative symbology does more than merely investigate cultural 
genres in abstraction from human social activity. It would become semiology 
if it did, whose corpus of data "must eliminate diachronic elements to the 
utmost" and coincide with a "state of the system, a cross-section of history" 
(Barthes, p, 98). When considering ritual data collected during my field- 
work among the Ndembu people of northwestern Zambia, 1 wrote that 
1 could not analyse [these] ritual symbols without studying them in a time series in relation 
to other "events" [regarding the symbol, too, as an "event" rather than a "thing"], for 
symbols are essentially involved in social process [and, 1 would now add, in psychological 
processes, too]. 1 came to see performances of ritual as  distinct phases in the social processes 
whereby groups became adjusted to internal changes [whether brought about by personal 
o r  factional dissensions and conflicts of norms or  by technical or organizational innova- 
tions], and adapted to their external environment [social and cultural, as  well as  physical 
and biotic]. From this standpoint the ritual symbol becomes a factor in social action, a 
positive force in an activity field. Symbols, too, are crucially involved in situations of 
societal change-the symbol becomes associated with human Interests, purposes, ends 
and means, aspirations and ideals, ~ndivtdual and collective, whether these are explicitly 
formulated or have to be inferred from the observed behavior. For these reasons, the 
structure and properties of a ritual symbol become those of a dynamic entity, at least 
within itsappropriatecontext of action. (Turner 1967:20) 
We shall take a closer look at some of these "properties" later, But I want 
to stress here that because from the very outset 1 formulate symbols as 
social and cultural dynamic systems, shedding and gathering meaning over 
time and altering in form, I cannot regard them merely as "terms" in atem- 
poral logical or protological cognitive systems. Undoubtedly, in the 
specialized genres of complex societies such as philosophical, theological, 
and formal logical systems, symbols, and the signs derived from their 
decomposition, do acquire this "algebraic" or logical quality, and can be 
treated effectively in relations of "binary opposition," as "mediators," and 
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the rest, denatured by the primacy of specialist cognitive activity. But "les 
symboles sauvages," as they appear not only in traditional, "tribal" cultures 
but also in the "cultural refreshment" genres (poetry, drama, and painting) 
of post-industrial society, have the character of dynamic semantic systems. 
They gain and lose meanings-and meaning in a social context always has 
emotional and volitional dimensions-as they "travel through" a single rite 
or work of art, let alone through centuries of performance, and they are 
aimed at producing effects on the psychological states and behavior of those 
exposed to them or obliged to use them for their communication with other 
human beings. I have always tried to link my work in processual analysis 
(for example, studies of the ongoing process of village politics in Schism 
and Continuity, 1957) with my work in the analysis of ritual performances. 
This is perhaps why 1 have often focused on the study of individual 
symbols, on their semantic fields and processual fate as they move through 
the scenario of a specific ritual performance and reappear in other kinds of 
ritual, or even transfer from one genre to another, for example, from ritual 
to a myth-cycle, to an epic, to a fairy tale, to citation as a maxim in a case 
at law. Such a focus leaves the semantic future of each symbol, as it were, 
open-ended. In contrast, formal analysis of a total set of symbols assumed 
a priori to be a system or a gestalt, treated as closed, atemporal, and syn- 
chronic, a "corpus," or finite collection of materials, tends to emphasize a 
given symbol's formal properties and relations and to select from its wealth 
of meaning only that specific designation which makes it an appropriate 
term in some binary opposition, itself a relational building block of a 
bounded cognitive system. Binariness and arbitrariness tend to  go together, 
and both are in the atemporal world of "signifiers." Such a treatment, while 
often seductively elegant, a.frisson for our cognitive faculties, removes the 
total set of symbols from the complex, continuously changing social life, 
murky or glinting with desire and feeling, which is its distinctive milieu and 
context, and imparts to it a dualistic rigor morris. SymboIs, both as sensorily 
perceptible vehicles (signifiants) and as sets of "meanings" (signiJiPs), are 
essentially involved in multiple variability. Living, conscious, emotional, 
and volitional creatures employ them not only to give order to the universe 
they inhabit, but creatively to make use also of disorder, both by over- 
coming or reducing it in particular cases and by its means questioning 
former axiomatic principles that have become a fetter on the understanding 
and manipulation of contemporary things. For example, Rabelais's dis- 
orderly, scatological heaps of symbolic forms standing for the disorderly 
deeds and attributes of Gargantua and Pantagruel challenged the neatness 
of scholastic theological and philosophical systems-the result, paradoxi- 
cally, was to blast away logically watertight obscurantism. When symbols are 
rigidified into logical operators and subordinated to implicit syntax-like 
rules, by some of our modern investigators, those of us who take them too 
seriously become blind to the creative or innovative potential of symbols as 
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factors in human action. Symbols may "instigate" such action and in situa- 
tionally varying combinations channel its direction by saturating goals and 
means with affect and desire. Comparative symbology does attempt to 
preserve this ludic capacity, to catch symbols in their movement, so to 
speak, and to "play" with their possibilities of form and meaning. I t  does 
this by contextualizing symbols in the concrete, historical fields of their 
use by "men alive" as they act, react, transact, and interact socially. Even 
when the symbolic is the inverse of the pragmatic reality, it remains inti- 
mately in touch with it, affects and is affected by it, provides the positive 
figure with its negative ground, thereby delimiting each, and winning for 
"cosmos" a new territory. 
Narrower in scope than semiotics, comparative symbology is wider than 
symbolic anthropology, for it proposes to take into account not oniy "ethno- 
graphic" materials, but also the symbolic genres of the so-called "advanced" 
civilizations, the complex, large-scale industrial societies. Undoubtedly, 
this broader perspective forces it to come to terms with the methods, 
theories, and findings of specialists and experts in many disciplines which 
most anthropologists know all too little about, such as history, literature, 
musicology, art history, theology, the history of religions, philosophy, and 
so on. Nevertheless, in making these attempts to study symbolic action in 
complex cultures, anthropologists, who now study symbols mainly in 
"tribal" or simple agrarian myth, ritual, and art, would be doing no more 
than returning to an honorable tradition of their predecessors. Durkheim 
and the Annke Sociologique school, Kroeber, Redfield, and their successors, 
and Professor Singer, have examined cultural sub-systems in "oikoumenes" 
(literally "inhabited worlds," used by Kroeber to indicate civilizational 
complexes, such as Christendom, Islam, Indic and Chinese civilization, and 
the like) and Great Traditions. 
In my own case, I was pressed towards the study of symbolic genres in 
large-scale societies by some implications of the work of Arnold van Gennep 
(which drew principally on the data of small-scale societies) in his Rites de 
Passage, first published in French in 1909. Although van Gennep himself 
seems to have intended that his term "rite of passage" should be used both 
for rituals accompanying the change in social status of an individual or a 
cohort of individuals, and for those associated with seasonal changes for an 
entire society, his book concentrates on the former type; and the term has 
come to be used almost exclusively in connection with these "life-crisis" 
rituals. I have tried to revert to van Gennep's earlier usage in regarding al- 
most all types of rites as having the processual form of 'passage." What 
does this term mean? 
Van Gennep distinguishes three phases in a rite of passage: separation, 
transition, and inclorporation. The first phase is separation, the phase which 
clearly demarcates sacred space and time from profane or secular space and 
LIMINAL T O  LIMINOID, IN PLAY, FLOW, AND RITUAL 57 
time (it is more than just a matter of entering a temple-there must be in 
addition a rite which changes the quality of time also, or constructs a 
cultural realm which is defined as "out of time," that is, beyond or outside 
the time which measures secular processes and routines). It includes sym- 
bolic behavior-especially symbols of reversal or inversion of secular things, 
relationships, and processes-which represents the detachment of the ritual 
subjects (novices, candidates, neophytes, or "initiands") from their previous 
social statuses. In the case of members of a society, it involves collectively 
moving from all that is socially and culturally involved in an agricultural 
season, or from a period of peace as against one of war, from plague to 
community health, from a previous sociocultural state or condition, to a 
new state or condition, a new turn of the seasonal wheel. During the inter- 
vening phase of transition, called by van Gennep "margin" or "limen" 
(meaning "threshold" in Latin), the ritual subjects pass through a period 
and area of ambiguity, a sort of social limbo which has few (though some- 
times these are most crucial) of the attributes of either the preceding or 
subsequent profane social statuses or cultural states. We will look at this 
liminal phase much more closely later. The third phase, called by van 
Gennep "re-aggregation" or "incorporation," includes symbolic phenomena 
and actions which represent the return of the subjects to their new, relatively 
stable, well-defined position in the total society. For those undergoing life- 
cycle ritual this usually represents an enhanced status, a stage further along 
life's culturally prefabricated road. For those taking part in a calendrical or 
seasonal ritual, no change in status may be involved, but they have been 
ritually prepared for a whole series of changes in the nature of the cultural 
and ecological activities to be undertaken and of the relationships they will 
then have with others-all these holding good for a specific quadrant of 
the annual productive cycle. Many passage rites are irreversible (for the 
individual subjects) one-shot-only affairs, while calendrical rites are re- 
peated every year by everyone; though, of course, one may attend the 
passage rites of one's kin or friends innumerable times, until one knows 
their form better than the initiands themselves-like the old ladies who 
"never miss a wedding" as compared with the nervous couple at their first 
marriage. I have argued that initiatory passage rites tend to "put people 
down" while some seasonal rites tend to "set people up"; that is, initiations 
humble people before permanently elevating them, while some seasonal 
rites (whose residues are carnivals and festivals) elevate those of low status 
transiently before returning them to their permanent humbleness. Van 
Gennep argued that the three phases of his schema varied in length and 
degree of elaboration in different kinds of passage: for example, "rites of 
separation are prominent in funeral ceremonies, rites of incorporation at 
marriages. Transition rites may play an important part, for instance, in 
pregnancy, betrothal, and initiation." The situation is further complicated 
by regional and ethnic differences which cut across typological ones. 
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Nevertheless, it is rare to find no trace of the three-part schema in "tribal" 
rituals. 
The passage from one social status to another is often accompanied by a 
parallel passage in space, a geographical movement from one place to an- 
other. This may take the form of a mere opening of doors or the literal 
crossing of a threshold which separates two distinct areas, one associated 
with the subject's pre-ritual or preliminal status, and the other with his 
post-ritual or postliminal status. (The draft inductee's "two steps forward" 
may serve as a modern instance of a ritualized move into liminality.) On 
the other hand, the spatial passage may involve a long, exacting pilgrimage 
and the crossing of many national frontiers before the subject reaches his 
goal, the sacred shrine, where paraliturgical action may replicate in micro- 
cosm the three-part schema at the shrine itself. Sometimes this spatial 
symbolism may be the precursor of a real and permanent change of residence 
or geographical sphere of action. For example, a Nyakusa or Ndembu girl, 
after her puberty rites, leaves her natal village to dwell in her husband's; in 
certain hunting societies young boys live with their mothers until the time 
of their initiation rites into adulthood, after which they begin to live with 
the other hunters of the tribe. Perhaps something of this thinking persists 
in our own society, when, in large bureaucratic organizations on the na- 
tional scale, such as the federal government, a major industrial corporation, 
or the university system, etc., promotion in status and salary usually in- 
volves movement in space from one city to another. This process is described 
by William Watson in Closed Systems and Open Minds as "spiralism." 
The "liminoid" phase between leaving one post and taking up another 
would repay study in terms of comparative symbology, both in regard to 
the subject (his dreams, fantasies, favorite reading and entertainment) and 
to those whom he is leaving and joining (their myths about him, treatment 
of him, and so on). But there will be more of this and of the distinction 
between "liminal" and "liminoid" later. 
According to van Gennep, an extended liminal phase in the initiation 
rites of tribal societies is frequently marked by the physical separation of the 
ritual subjects from the rest of society. Thus in certain Australian, Melane- 
sian, and African tribes, a boy undergoing initiation must spend a long 
period of time living in the bush, cut off from the normal social interactions 
within the village and household. Ritual symbols of this phase, though 
some represent inversion of normal reality, characteristically fall into two 
types: those of effacement and those of ambiguity or paradox. Hence, in 
many societies the liminal initiands are often considered to be dark, invisible, 
like a planet in eclipse or the moon between phases; they are stripped of 
names and clothing, smeared with the common earth, rendered indistin- 
guishable from animals. They are also associated with life and death, male 
and female, food and excrement, simultaneously, since they are at once 
dying from or dead to their former status and life, and being born and 
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growing into new ones. Sharp symbolic inversion of social attributes may 
characterize separation; blurring and merging of distinctions may charac- 
terize liminality. 
Thus, the ritual subjects in these rites undergo a "leveling" process, in 
which signs of their preliminal status are destroyed and signs of their liminal 
non-status are applied. I have mentioned certain indicators of their limi- 
nality (absence of clothing and names): other signs include not eating or not 
eating specified foods, disregard of personal appearance, the wearing of 
uniform clothing, sometimes irrespective of sex. In mid-transition the 
initiands are pushed as far toward uniformity, structural invisibility, and 
anonymity as possible. 
By way of compensation, the initiands acquire a special kind of freedom, 
a "sacred power" of the meek, weak, and humble. As van Gennep elabo- 
rates: 
During the entire novitiate, the usual economic and legal ties are modified, sometimes 
broken altogether. The novices are outside society, and society has no  power over them, 
especially since they are actually [in terms of indigenous beliefs] sacred and holy, and 
therefore untouchable and dangerous, just as  gods would be. Thus, although taboos, as  
negativerites, erect a barrier between the novices and society, the soc~ety IS helpless against 
the novices' undertakings. That is the explanation-the simplest in the world-for a fact 
that has been noted among a great many peoples and that has remained incomprehensible 
t o  observers. Durlng the novitiate, the young people can steal and pillage at  will or feed 
and adorn themselvesat the expense of thecommunlty. (1960:114) 
If only students in our culture were granted similar immunities concordant 
with their intellectually liminal situation! 
The novices are, in fact, temporarily undefined, beyond the normative 
social structure. This weakens them, since they have no rights over others. 
But it also liberates them from structural obligations. It places them too in 
a close connection with asocial powers of life and death. Hence the frequent 
comparison of novices on the one hand with ghosts, gods, or ancestors, and 
on the other with animals or birds. They are dead to the social world, but 
alive to the asocial world. Many societies make a dichotomy, explicit or 
implicit, between sacred and profane, cosmos and chaos, order and dis- 
order. In liminality, profane social relations may be discontinued, former 
rights and obligations are suspended, the social order may seem to have 
been turned upside down. By way of compensation, cosmological systems 
(as objects of serious study) may become of central importance for the 
novices. They are confronted by the elders, in rite, myth, song, instruction 
in a secret language, and various non-verbal symbolic genres (such as 
dancing, painting, clay-molding, wood-carving, masking, and the like), 
with symbolic patterns and structures which amount to  teachings about 
the structure of the cosmos and their culture as a part and product of it, 
insofar as these are defined and comprehended, whether implicitly or ex- 
plicitly. Liminality is a complex series of episodes in sacred space-time, and 
may also include subversive and ludic events. The factors of culture are 
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isolated, insofar as it is possible to do  this with multivocal symbols (that is, 
with the aid of symbol-vehicles-sensorily perceptible forms) that are each 
susceptible not of a single but of many meanings. Then they may be re- 
combined in numerous, often grotesque ways, grotesque because they are 
arrayed in terms of possible rather than experienced combinations-thus 
a monster disguise may combine human, animal, and vegetable features in 
an "unnatural" way, while the same features may be differently, but equally 
"unnaturally" combined in a painting or described in a tale. In other words, 
in liminality people "play" with the elements of the familiar and defamiliarize 
them. Novelty emerges from unprecedented combinations of familiar ele- 
ments. In the 1972 American Anthropological Association Meetings in 
Toronto, Brian Sutton-Smith borrowed a term which I have applied to 
liminality (and other social phenomena and events), "anti-structure" (mean- 
ing dissolution of normative social structure, with its role-sets, statuses, 
jural rights and duties, and so on). He related it to a series of experimental 
studies he has been making of children's (and some adult) games both in 
tribal and industrial societies. Much of what he says, muratis nnutandis, can 
be transferred to the study of liminality in tribal ritual. He writes: 
The normative structure represents the working equilibrium, the anti-structure represents 
the latent system of potential alternatives from which novelty will arise when contingencies 
in the normative system require it. We might more correctly call this second system the 
proto-structural system [he says] because it is the precursor of innovative normative 
forms. It IS thesource of new culture. (Sutton-Smith 1972: 18- 19) 
Sutton-Smith, who recently has been examining the continuum order- 
disorder in games (such as the children's ring-a-ring-a-roses), goes on to say 
that 
we may be disorderly in games [and, I would add, in the liminality of rituals, as well as  In 
such"liminoid" phenomena as charivaris, fiestas, Halloween masking and mumming, etc.] 
either because we have an overdose of order, and want to  let off steam [the "conservative" 
view of ritual disorder, such as ritual reversals, Satutnalia, and the like], or because we 
havesomething to learn through beingdisorderly. (1972: 17) 
What interests me most about Sutton-Smith's formulations is that he sees 
liminal and liminoid situations as the settings in which new symbols, models, 
and paradigms arise-as the seedbeds of cultural creativity in fact. These 
new symbols and constructions then feed back into the "central" economic 
and politico-legal domains and arenas, supplying them with goals, aspira- 
tions, incentives, structural models, and raisons dptre. 
Some have argued that liminality, more specifically "liminal" phenomena 
such as myth and ritual in tribal society, is best characterized by the estab- 
lishment of "implicit syntax-like rules" or by "internal structures of logical 
relations of opposition and mediation between the discrete symbolic ele- 
ments" of the myth or ritual. Claude Lkvi-Strauss would perhaps take this 
view. But to my mind it is the analysis of culture into factors and their free 
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or "ludic" recombination in any and every possible pattern, however weird, 
that is of the essence of liminality, liminality par excellence. This may be 
seen if one studies liminal phases of major rituals cross-culturally and cross- 
temporally. When implicit rules begin to appear which limit the possible 
combination of factors to certain conventional patterns, designs, or figura- 
tions, then, I think, we are seeing the intrusion of normative social structure 
into what is potentially and in principle a free and experimental region of 
culture, a region where not only new elements but also new combinatory 
rules may be introduced-far more readily than in the case of language. This 
capacity for variation and experiment becomes more clearly dominant in 
societies in which leisure is sharply demarcated from work, and especially 
in all societies which have been shaped by the Industrial Revolution. Various 
L6vi-Straussian models, such as the one dealing with metaphorical and 
oppositional logical relations and the transformation to humanity, from 
nature to culture, and the geometric model which utilizes two sets of oppo- 
sitions in the construction of a "culinary triangle," raw/cooked:raw/rotten, 
seem to me to be applicable mainly to tribal or early agrarian societies where 
work and life tend to be governed by seasonal and ecological rhythms. The 
models apply in situations where the rules underlying the generation of 
cultural patterns tend to seek out the binary "Yin-Yang," forms suggested by 
simple "natural" oppositions, such as hot/cold, wet/dry, cultivated/wild, 
malelfemale, summer/winter, plenty/scarcity, and the like. The main social 
and cultural structures tend to become modeled on these cosmological 
principles, which determine even the layout of cities and villages, the design 
of houses, and the shape and spatial placement of different types of cultivated 
land. It is not surprising that liminality itself cannot escape the grip of these 
strong structuring principles. Only certain types of children3 games and 
play are allowed some degree of freedom because these are defined as struc- 
turally "irrelevant," not "mattering." When children are initiated into the 
early grades of adulthood, however, variabilities and labilities of social 
behavior are drastically curtailed and controlled. Law, morality, ritual, even 
much of economic life, fall under the structuring influence of cosmological 
principles. The cosmos becomes a complex weave of "correspondences" 
based on analogy, metaphor, and metonymy. For example, the Dogon of 
West Africa, according to Marcel Griaule, Genevieve Calame-Griaule, and 
Germaine Dieterlen, establish a correspondence between the different cate- 
gories of minerals and the organs of the body. The various soils are conceived 
of as the organs of "the interior of the stomach," rocks are regarded as the 
"bones" of the skeleton, and various hues of red clay are likened to "the 
blood" (see my discussion of Dogon cosmology, 1974: 156- 165). Similarly, 
in medieval China, different ways of painting trees and clouds are related 
to different cosmological principles. 
Thus the symbols found in rites de passage in these societies, though 
subject to permutations and transformations of their relationships, are only 
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involved in these within relatively stable, cyclical, and repetitive systems. 
It is to these kinds of systems that the term "liminality" properly belongs. 
When used of processes, phenomena, and persons in large-scale complex 
societies, its use must in the main be metaphorical. That is, the word "limi- 
nality," used primarilv of a phase in the processual structure of a rite de 
passage, is applied to other aspects of culture-here in societies of far greater 
scale and complexity. This brings me to a watershed division in comparative 
symbology. Failure to distinguish between symbolic systems and genres 
belonging to cultures which have developed before and after the Industrial 
Revolution can lead to  much confusion both in theoretical treatment and in 
operational methodology. 
Let me try to spell this out. Despite immense diversities within each 
camp, there still remains a fundamental distinction at the level of expressive 
culture between all societies before and a11 societies subsequent to the 
Industrial Revolution, including the industrializing Third World societies, 
which, though dominantly agrarian, nevertheless represent the granaries or 
playgrounds of metropolitan industrial societies. 
Key concepts here are work, play, and leisure. Placing a different explana- 
tory stress on each or any combination of these can influence how we think 
about symbolic manipulation sets, symbolic genres, in the types of societies 
we will consider. Each of these concepts is multivocal or multivalent, each 
has many designations. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, "work" 
means: 
(1) expenditure of energy, striving, application of effort to some purpose [this fits fairly 
well with Webster's primary sense: "physical or mental effort exerted to d o  or  to make 
something; purposefulactivity; labor; toil"]; (2) task to  be undertaken. materials to be used 
in task; (3) thing done, achievement, thing made, book or  piece of literary or mus~cal 
composition [note this application of "work" t o  the genres of the leisure domain], nieri- 
rorious act as opposed to faith or grace; (4) doings or  experiences of specified kind, e.g., 
sharp, bloody, thirsty, wild, dry, etc., work [work often has this focused, singular ca- 
pacity]; (5) emplo.vment, especially the opportunity of earning money by labour, laborious 
occupation; ( 6 )  ordinary, practical (as in workaday), etc. [where it has resonances with 
secular, profane, pragmatic, and so on]. 
Now in "tribal," "preliterate," "simpler," "small-scale" societies, the types 
studied by anthropologists, ritual, and to some extent, myth, are regarded 
as "work" precisely in this sense, what the Tikopia call "the work of the 
Gods." Ancient Hindu society also posits a "divine work." In the third 
chapter of the Bhagavadgita (v.14- 15) we find a connection made between 
sacrifice and work:'"From food do all contingent beings derive, and food 
derives from rain; rain derives from sacrifice and sacrifice from work. From 
Brahman work arises." Nikhilananda (1952:I 10) comments that "work" 
(action) here refers to the sacrifice prescribed in the Vedas, which pre- 
scribes for "householders" sacrifice or work. The Ndembu call that which 
a ritual specialist does kuzata, "work," and the same general term is applied 
to what a hunter, a cultivator, a headman, and, today, a manual laborer, 
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do. Even in fairly complex agrarian societies associated with "city-state" or 
"feudal" polities, well within the scope of historical documentation, we find 
terms like liturgy which in pre-Christian Greece early became established 
as "public service to the gods." Liturgy is derived from the Greek leos or 
laos, "the people," and ergon, "work" (cognate with Old English weorc. 
German werk, from the Indo-European base, we@-, "to do, act." The 
Greek organon, "tool, instrument" derives from the same base-orginally 
worganon). The work of men is thus the work of the Gods, a conclusion 
which would have delighted Durkheim, though it could be construed as 
implying a fundamental distinction between gods and men, since men co- 
operated in ritual the better to enter into reciprocal, exchange relations 
with the gods or with God-it was not simply that "the voice of the congre- 
gation was the voice of God." A difference was construed between creator 
and created. Whatever may have been the empirical case, what we are 
seeing here is a universe of work, an ergon- or organic. universe, in which 
the main distinction is between sacred and profane work, not between work 
and leisure. For example, Samuel Beal comments in his Travels of' Fah- 
Hian and Sung- Yun, Buddhist Pilgrimsfrom China to India (400 A.D. and 
518 A.D.) (19645) on Chi Fah-Hian's use of the term Shaman, as follows: 
"The Chinese word Shaman represents phonetically the Sanscrit 'Sramana,' 
or the Pali 'Samana.' The Chinese word is defined to mean 'diligent and 
laborious' . . . . The Sanscrit root is 'sram,' to be fatigued." (He was referring 
to the people of Shen-Shen, in the desert of Makhai, part of the Gobi 
desert region.) It is, furthermore, a universe of work in which whole com- 
munities participate, as of obligation, not optation. The whole community 
goes through the entire ritual round, whether in terms of total or represen- 
tative participation. Thus, some rites, such as those of sowing, first fruits, 
or harvest, may involve everyone, man, woman, and child, others may be 
focused on specific groups, categories, associations, etc., such as men or 
women, old or young, one clan or another, one association or secret society 
or another. Yet the whole ritual round adds up to the total participation of 
the whole community. Sooner or later, no one is exempt from ritual duty, 
just as no one is exempt from economic, legal, or political duty. Communal 
participation, obligation, the passage of the whole society through crises, 
collective and individual, directly or by proxy, are the hallmarks of "the 
work of the gods" and sacred human work. Without it profane human 
work would be, for the community, impossible to conceive, though, no 
doubt, as history has cruelly demonstrated to those conquered by industrial 
societies, possible to live, or, at least, exist through. 
Yet it can be argued that this "work" is not work, as we in industrial 
societies know it, but has in both its dimensions, sacred and profane, an 
element of "play." Insofar as the community and its individual members 
regard themselves as the masters or "owners" of ritual and liturgy, or as 
representatives of the ancestors and gods who ultimately "own" them, they 
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have authority to introduce, under certain culturally determined conditions, 
elements of novelty from time to  time into the socially inherited deposit of 
ritual customs. Liminality, the seclusion period, is a phase peculiarly con- 
ducive to such "ludic" invention. Perhaps it would be better to regard the 
distinction between "work" and "play," or better between "work" and 
"leisure" (which includes but exceeds play sui generis), as itself an artifact 
of the Industrial Revolution, and to see such symbolic-expressive genres 
as ritual and myth as being at once "work" and "play" or at least as cultural 
activities in which work and play are intricately intercalated. Yet it often 
happens that the historically later can throw light on the earlier, especially 
when there is a demonstrable sociogenetic connection between them. For 
there are undoubtedly "ludic" aspects in "tribal," etc., culture, especially in 
the liminal periods of protracted initiation or calendrically based rituals. 
Such would include joking relationships, sacred games, such as the ball 
games of the ancient Maya and modern Cherokee, riddles, mock-ordeals, 
holy fooling and clowning, Trickster tales told in liminaf times and places 
(in or out of ritual contexts), and a host of other types. 
The point is, though, that these "play" or "ludic" aspects of tribal and 
agrarian ritual and myth are, as Durkheim says, "de la vie si.rieuse," that 
is, they are intrinsically connected with the "work" of the collectivity in 
performing symbolic actions and manipulating symbolic objects so as to 
promote and increase fertility of men, crops, and animals, domestic and 
wild, to cure illness, to avert plague, to obtain success in raiding, to turn 
boys into men and girls into women, to make chiefs out of commoners, to 
transform ordinary people into shamans and shamanins, to "cool" those 
"hot" from the warpath, to ensure the proper succession of seasons and the 
hunting and agricultural responses of human beings to them, and so forth. 
Thus the play is in earnest, and has to be within bounds. For example, in 
the Ndembu Twin Ritual, Wubwang'u, described in The Ritual Process, in 
one episode women and men abuse one another verbally in a highly sexual 
and jocose way. Much personal inventiveness goes into the invective, 
though much is also stylized. Nevertheless, this ludic behavior is pressed 
into the service of the ultimate aim of the ritual-to produce healthy off- 
spring, but not too many healthy offspring at once. Abundance is good, 
but reckless abundance is a foolish joke. "Enough's enough, but this is 
ridiculous!" Hence cross-sexual joking both maintains reasonable fertility 
and restrains unreasonable fecundity. Joking is fun, but it is also a social 
sanction. Even joking must observe the "golden mean," which is an ethical 
feature of "cyclical, repetitive societies," not as yet unbalanced by innova- 
tive ideas and technical changes. 
Technical innovations are the products of ideas, the products of what I 
will call the "liminoid" (the "-oid" here, as in asteroid, starlike, ovoid, egg- 
shaped, etc., derives from Greek -eidos, a form, shape, and means "like, 
resembling"; "liminoid" resembles without being identical with "liminal") 
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and what Marx assigned to a domain he called "the superstructural"-I 
would prefer to talk about the "anti-," "meta-," or  bbprotostructural." 
"Superstructural," for Marx, has the connotation of a distorted mirroring 
of the "structural," which is, in his terms, the constellation of productive 
relations, both in cohesion and conflict. On the contrary, 1 would see the 
"liminoid" as an independent and critical source-like Marx's own liminoid 
"works." Here we will observe how "liminoid" actions of industrial leisure 
genres can repossess the character of "work" though originating in a "free- 
time" arbitrarily separated by managerial fiat from the time of "laborw-and 
how the liminoid can be an independent domain of creative activity, not 
simply a distorted mirror-image, mask, or cloak for structural activity in 
the "centers" or "mainstreams" of "productive social labor." This is to 
identify liminoid productions with apologia for the political status quo. 
"Anti-structure," in fact, can generate and store a plurality of alternative 
models for living, from utopias to programs, which are capable of influenc- 
ing the behavior of those in mainstream social and political roles (whether 
authoritative or dependent, in control or  rebelling against it) in the direction 
of radical change. As scientists we are interested in demarcating a domain, 
not in taking sides with one or other of the groups or categories which 
operate within it. Experimental and theoretical science itself is "liminoid" 
-it takes place in "neutral spaces" or privileged areas (laboratories and 
studies) set aside from the mainstream of productive events. Universities, 
institutes, colleges, etc., are "liminoid" settings for all kinds of freewheeling, 
experimental cognitive behavior as well as forms of symbolic action, re- 
sembling some found in tribal society ("rushing" and "pledging" ceremonies, 
for example!). 
But let us look more closely at this notion of the "liminoid," and try to 
distinguish it from the "liminal." To  do  this properly, we have to examine 
the notion of "play." Etymology does not tell us too much about its mean- 
ing. We learn that the word "play" is derived from OE plegan, "to exercise 
oneself, move briskly," and that the Middle Dutch pleyen. "to dance," is a 
cognate term. Walter Skeat, in his Concise Etymological Dictionary of'the 
English Language (p. 355) suggests that the Anglo-Saxon plega, "a game, 
sport," is also (commonly) "a fight, a battle." He considers, too, that the 
Anglo-Saxon terms are borrowed from the Latin plaga, "a stroke." Even 
if the idea of a "danced-out or  ritualized fight" gets into subsequent denota- 
tions of "play," this multi-vocal concept has its own historical destiny. 
For Websrer's Dictionary, play is: 
(1) action, motion, or activity, esp. when free, rapid, or light (e.g., the p l a ~ l  of muscles) 
[here, as  so often, "play" is conceived of as "light" as against the "heaviness" of "work," 
"free" as against work's "necessary" or  "obligatory" character, "rapid" as against the care- 
ful, reflected-upon style of work routines]; (2) freedom or scope for motion or action; 
(3) activity engaged in for amusement or  recreation [here, again, we are verging on  the 
notion of activities disengaged from necessity or obligation]; (4) fun, joking (to do a thing 
inplay) [emphasizing the non-serious character of certain types of modern play]; (5) (a) 
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the playing of a game, (b) the way or technique of playing a game [here reintroducing the 
notion that play might be work, might be serious within ~ t s  non-serious dimens~on, and 
raising the problem of what are the conditions under which "fun" becomes "technique" 
and rule-governed]; (6) (a) a maneuver, move, o r  act in a game (e.g., the "w~shbone" or  
"T' offensive formation in American football o r  a specific brilliant move by a team or 
individual), (b) a turn at  play~ng (e.g., "there's one play left in the game"); (7) the act of 
gambling [and here we may t h ~ n k  of the "gambling" character of divination In tribal and 
even in feudal soclety, and, of course, the very word "gamble"' is derived from OE 
gamenian, "to play" akin to the German dialect term gamrneln, "to sport, make merry"]; 
(8) a dramatic composition or performance; drama, "the play's the thing"' [clearly t h ~ s  
term preserves something of the earlier sense of "fight, battle" as well as those of "recre- 
ation," "technique," and "turns (i.e., acts, scenes, etc.) at  playing"]; (9) sexual activity, 
dalliance. 
Here again we can see a shift from the meaning of sex as procreative "work," 
(a persistent meaning in tribal and feudal societies) to  the division of sexual 
activity into "play" or "foreplay," and the "serious" business or "work" of 
begetting progeny. Post-industrial birth control techniques make this divi- 
sion practically realizable, and themselves exemplify the division between 
work and play brought about by modern systems of production and thought, 
both "objectively," in the domain of culture, and "subjectively" in the 
individual conscience and consciousness. The distinction between "subjec- 
tive" and "objective" is itself an artifact of the sundering of work and play. 
For "work" is held to be the realm of the rational adaptation of means to 
ends, of "objectivity," while "play" is thought of as divorced from this 
essentially "objective" realm, and, insofar as it is its inverse, being "sub- 
jective," free from external constraints, where any and every combination 
of variables can be "played" with. Indeed, Jean Piaget, who has done most 
to study the developmental psychology of play, regards it as "a kind of 
free assimilation, without accommodation to spatial conditions or to the 
significance of the objects" (1962:86). 
In the liminal phases and states of tribal and agrarian cuItures-in ritual, 
myth, and legal processes-work and play are hardly distinguishable in 
many cases. Thus, in Vedic India, according to Alain Danielou (1964:144), 
the "gods [sura and deva, who are objects of serious sacrificial ritual] play. 
The rise, duration and destruction of the world is their game." Ritual is 
both earnest and playful. As Milton Singer has pointed out (1972:160), the 
"Krishna dance" in an urban bhajana program (group hymn singing) is 
called lila, "sports," in which the participants "play" at being the "Gopis" 
or milkmaids who"sport" in a variety ofways with Krishna, Vishnu incarnate, 
reliving the myth. But the Gopi's erotic love-play with Krishna has mystical 
implications, like the Song of Solomon-it is at once serious and playful, 
God's "sport" with the human soul. 
Now let us consider the clear division between work and leisure which 
modern industry has produced, and how this has affected all symbolic 
genres, from ritual to games and literature. Joffre Dumazedier, of the 
Centre d'Etudes Sociologiques (Paris), is not the only authority who holds 
LIMINAL T O  LIMINOID, IN PLAY, FLOW, AND RITUAL 
that leisure "has certain traits that are characteristic only of the civilization 
born from the industrial revolution" (1968; see also 1962). But he puts the 
case very pithily and I am beholden to his argument. Dumazedier dismisses 
the view that leisure has existed in all societies at all times. In archaic and 
tribal societies, he maintains, "work and play alike formed part of the 
ritual by which men sought communion with the ancestral spirits. Religious 
festivals embodied both work and play" (1968:248). Yet religious specialists 
such as shamans and medicine-men did not constitute a "leisure-class" in 
Veblen's sense, since they performed religious or magical functions for the 
whole community (and, as we have seen, shamanism is a "diligent and 
laborious" profession). Similarly, in the agricultural societies of recorded 
history, 
the working year followed a timetable written in the very passage of the days and sea- 
sons: in good weather work was hard, in bad weather it slackened off. Work of this kind 
had a natural rhythm to it, punctuated by rests, songs, games, and ceremonies, ~t was 
synonymous with the daily round, and in some regions began at  sunrise, to f in~sh only at  
sunset. . . the cycle of the year was also marked by a whole serles of sabbaths and feast 
days. The sabbath belonged to  religion; feast days, however, were often occasions for a 
great investment of energy (not to mentlon food) and constituted the obverse or opposite 
of everyday life [often characterized by symbolic inversion and status reversal]. But the 
ceremonial [or ritual] aspect of these celebrations could not be disregarded; they stemmed 
from religion [defined a s  sacred work], not leisure [as we think of it today]. . . . They were 
imposed by religious requirements . . . [and] the major European civilizations knew more 
than 150 workless daysa year. (1968:249) 
Sebastian de Grazia has recently argued (1962) that the origins of leisure 
can be traced to the way of life enjoyed by certain aristocratic classes in 
the course of Western civilization. Dumazedier disagrees, pointing out that 
the idle state of Greek philosophers and sixteenth century gentry cannot 
be defined in relation to work, but rather replaces work altogether. Work 
is done by slaves, peasants, or servants. True leisure exists only when it 
complements or rewards work. This is not to  say that many of the refine- 
ments of human culture did not come from this aristocratic idleness. 
Dumazedier thinks that it is significant that the Greek word for having 
nothing to do (schole) also meant "school." "The courtiers of Europe, after 
the end of the Middle Ages, both invented and extolled the ideal of the 
humanist and the gentleman" (1968:249). 
"Leisure," then, presupposes "work": it is a non-work, even an anti-work 
phase in the life of a person who also works. If we were to indulge in termi- 
nological neophily, we might call it anergic as against ergic! Leisure arises, 
says Dumazedier, under two conditions. First, society ceases to govern its 
activities by means of common ritual obligations: some activities, including 
work and leisure, become, a t  least in theory, subjecr to individual choice. 
Secondly, the work by which a person earns his or her living is "set apart 
from his other activities: its limits are no longer natural [my italics] but 
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arbitrary-indeed, it is organized in so definite a fashion that it can easily 
be separated, both in theory and in practice, from his free time" (1968:249). 
It is only in the social life of industrial and postindustrial civilizations that 
we find these necessary conditions. Other social theorists, both radical and 
conservative, have pointed out that leisure is the product of industrialized, 
rationalized, bureaucratized, large-scale socioeconomic systems with arbi- 
trary rather than natural delimitation of "work" from "free time" or "time 
out." Work is now organized by industry so as to be separated from "free 
time," which includes, in addition to leisure, attendance to such personal 
needs as eating, sleeping, and caring for one's health and appearance, as 
well as familial, social, civic, political, and religious obligations (which 
would have fallen within the domain of the work-play continuum in tribal 
society). Leisure is predominantIy an urban phenomenon, so that when 
the concept of leisure begins to penetrate rural societies, it is because agri- 
cultural labor is tending towards an  industrial, "rationalized" mode of 
organization, and because rural life is becoming permeated by the urban 
values of industrialization. This holds good for the "Third World" today 
as well as for the rural hinterlands of long-established industrial societies. 
Leisure-time is associated with two types of freedom, '6freedom-fromn' 
and "freedom-to," to advert to Isiah Berlin's famous distinction. I) It repre- 
sents freedom from a whole heap of institutional obligations prescribed by 
the basic forms of social, particularly technological and bureaucratic, or- 
ganization. 2) For each individual, it means .freedom from the forced, 
chronologically regulated rhythms of factory and office and a chance to 
recuperate and enjoy natural, biological rhythms again. 
Leisure is also 1) freedom to enter, even to generate new symbolic worlds 
of entertainment, sports, games, diversions of all kinds. It is, furthermore, 
2) freedom to transcend social structural limitations, freedom to p1a.v-with 
ideas, with fantasies, with words (from Rabelais to Joyce and Samuel 
Beckett), with paint (from the Impressionists to Action Painting and Art 
Nouveau), and with social relationships-in friendship, sensitivity training, 
psychodramas, and in other ways. Here far more than in tribal or agrarian 
rites and ceremonies, the ludic and the experimental are stressed, In com- 
plex, organic-solidary societies, there are obviously many more options; 
games of skilI, strength, and chance can serve as models for future behavior 
or models of past work experience-now viewed as release from work's 
necessities and as something one chooses to do. Sports such as football, 
games such as chess, recreations such as mountaineering can be hard and 
exacting and governed by rules and routines even more stringent than those 
of the work situation, but, since they are optional, they are part of an 
individual's freedom, of his growing self-mastery, even self-transcendence. 
Hence they are imbued more thoroughly with pleasure than those many 
types of industrial work in which men are alienated from the fruits and 
results of their labor. Leisure is potentially capable of releasing creative 
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powers, individual or communal, either to criticize or buttress the dominant 
social structural values. 
It is certain that no one is committed to a true leisure activity by material 
need or by moral or legal obligations, as is the case with the activities of 
getting an education, earning a living, or participating in civic or religious 
ceremonies. Even when there is effort, as in competitive sport, that effort- 
and the discipline of training-is chosen voluntarily, in the expectation of 
an enjoyment that is disinterested, is unmotivated by gain, and has no utili- 
tarian or ideological purpose. 
But if this is ideally the spirit of leisure, the cultural reality of leisure is 
obviously influenced by the domain of work from which it has been split 
by the wedge of industrial organization. Work and leisure interact, each 
individual participates in both realms, and the modes of work organization 
affect the styles of leisure pursuits. Let us consider the case of those mainly 
Northern European and North American societies whose preliminary 
industrialization was accompanied and infused with the spirit of what Max 
Weber has called "the Protestant Ethic." This ethical milieu, or set of values 
and beliefs, which Weber thought was an auspicious condition for the 
growth of modern, rational capitalism, in my view produced effects in the 
leisure domain quite as far-reaching as in that of work. As everyone now 
knows, Weber argued that John Calvin and other Protestant reformers 
taught that salvation is a pure gift from God and cannot be earned or 
merited by a being so thoroughly depraved in his nature since the Fall of 
Adam as man. In its extreme form, Predestination, this meant that no one 
could be certain of being saved, or indeed of being damned. This threatened 
seriously to undermine individual morale, and a get-out clause evolved at 
the level of popular culture, though it could not be made theologically 
watertight. This was that he who is in God's grace and (invisibly) among 
the elect by God's foreordaining does actually manifest in his behavior 
systematic self-control and obedience to the will of God. By these outward 
signs it may be known to others and he can reassure himself that he is 
among the elect, and will not suffer eternal damnation with the reprobate. 
But. the Calvinist is never finally certain that he will be saved and thus 
dedicates himself to an incessant examination of the conditions of his in- 
ward soul and outward life for evident indications of the work of salvific 
grace. In a sense, what was in cultural history previously the social "work 
of the Gods," the calendrical, liturgical round, or, rather, its penances and 
ordeals, not its festive rewards, became "internalized" as the systematic, 
non-ludic "work" of the individual's conscience. 
Calvinist emphasis was also on the notion of one's calling in life, one's 
vocation. As against the Catholic notion of "vocation" as the call to a reli- 
gious life, by vows of chastity, obedience, and poverty, the Calvinist held 
that it was precisely a person's worldly occupation that must be regarded 
as the sphere in which he was to serve God through his dedication to his 
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work. Work and leisure were made separate spheres, and "work" became 
sacred de facto, as the arena in which one's salvation might be objectively 
demonstrated. Thus, the man of property was to act as a steward of worldly 
goods, like Joseph in Egypt. He was to use them not for sinful luxury, but 
to better the moral condition of himself, his family, and his employees. 
"Betterment" implied self-discipline, self-examination, hard work, dedica- 
tion to one's duty and calling, and an insistence that those under one's 
authority should do  the same. Wherever the Calvinist aspiration to theoc- 
racy became influential, as in Geneva or in the transient dominance of 
English Puritanism, legislation was introduced to force men to better their 
spiritual state through thrift and hard work. For example, English Puri- 
tanism affected not only religious worship by its attack on "ritualism," but 
also reduced "ceremonial" ("secular" ritual) to a minimum in many other 
fields of activity, including drama, which it stigmatized as "mummery." 
The Act making stage performances illegal cut twenty-odd years from the 
performance of Jonson's plays. Among the targets of such legislation were, 
significantly, genres of leisure entertainment which had developed in aristo- 
cratic or mercantilist circles in the proto-industrializing period, such as 
theatrical productions, masques, pageants, musical performances, and, of 
course, the popular genres of carnivals, festivals, charivaris, ballad singing, 
and miracle plays. These represented the "ludic" face of the work-play 
continuum that had formerly caught up the whole of society into a single 
process moving through sacred and profane, solemn and festive, phases in 
the seasonal round. The Calvinists wanted "no more cakes and ale"-or 
other festival foods that beIonged to the work and play of the gods. They 
wanted ascetic dedication to the mainline economic enterprise, the sanctifi- 
cation of what was formerly mostly profane, or, at least, subordinated to 
and ancillary to the sacred cosmological paradigms. Weber argues that 
when the religious motivations of Calvinism were lost after a few generations 
of worldly success, the focus on self-examination, self-discipline, and hard 
work in one's calling even when secularized continued to promote the ascetic 
dedication to systematic profits, reinvestment of earnings, and thrift, which 
were the hallmarks of nascent capitalism. 
Something of this systematic, vocational character of the Protestant 
ethic came to tinge even the entertainment genres of industrial leisure. To 
coin a term, even leisure became "ergic," "of the nature of work," rather 
than "ludic," "of the nature of play." Thus we have a serious division of 
labor in the entertainment business: acting, dancing, singing, art, writing, 
composing, and so on, become professionalized "vocations." Educational 
institutions prepare actors, dancers, singers, painters, and authors for their 
"careers." At a higher level, there grew up in the late eighteenth and especi- 
ally in the nineteenth centuries the notion of "art" itself, in its various 
modalities, as a quasi-religious vocation, with its own asceticism and total 
dedication, from William Blake, through Kierkegaard, Baudelaire, Ler- 
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montov, and Rimbaud, to Ckzanne, Proust, Rilke, and Joyce, not to 
mention Beethoven, Mahler, Sibelius, and so forth. 
Another aspect of this influence of the Protestant ethic on leisure is in 
the realm of play itself. As Edward Norbeck has recently said: 
America's forefathers believed strongly in the set of values known as the Protestant ethic. 
Devotion to  work was a Christian virtue; and play, the enemy of work, was reluctantly 
and charily permitted only to children. Even now, these values are far from extinct In our 
nation, and the old admonition that play is the devil's handiwork continues to live In 
secular thought. Although play has now become almost respectable, it is still someth~ng 
in which we "indulge" (as in sexual acts), a form of moral laxness. (1971) 
Organized sport ("pedagogic" play) better fits the Puritan tradition than 
unorganized children's play ("pediarchic" play) or mere dalliance, which is 
time wasted. 
Nevertheless, modern industrial or post-industrial societies have shed 
many of these anti-leisure attitudes. Technological development, political 
and industrial organization by workers, action by liberal employers, revolu- 
tions in many parts of the world, have had the cumulative effect of bringing 
more leisure into the "free-time" of industrial cultures. In this leisure 
symbolic genres, both of the entertainment and instructive sorts, have 
proliferated. In my book The Ritual Process, 1 have spoken of some of these 
as "liminal" phenomena. In view of what 1 have just said, is liminality an 
adequate label for this set of symbolic activities and forms? Clearly, there 
are some respects in which these "anergic" genres share characteristics 
with the "ludergic" rituals and myths (if we contrast the Hindu and Judaic 
ritual style) of archaic, tribal, and early agrarian cultures. Leisure can be 
conceived of as a betwixt-and-between, a neither-this-nor-that domain 
between two spells of work or between occupational and familial and civic 
activity. Leisure is etymologically derived from Old French leisir, which 
itself derives from Latin licere, "to be permitted." Interestingly enough, it 
ultimately comes from the Indo-European base *leik-, "to offer for sale, 
bargain," referring to the "liminal" sphere of the market, with its implica- 
tions of choice, variation, contract-a sphere that has connections, in 
archaic and tribal religions, with Trickster deities such as Elegba, Eshu, 
and Hermes. Exchange is more "liminal" than production. Just as when 
tribesmen make masks, disguise themselves as monsters, heap up disparate 
ritual symbols, invert or parody profane reality in myths and folk-tales, so 
do the genres of industrial leisure, the theater, poetry, novel, ballet, film, 
sport, rock music, classical music, art, pop art, and so on, plav with the 
factors of culture, sometimes assembling them in random, grotesque, im- 
probable, surprising, shocking, usually experimental combinations. But 
they do this in a much more complicated way than in the liminality of tribal 
initiations. They multiply specialized genres of artistic and popular enter- 
tainments, mass culture, pop cuIture, folk culture, high culture, counter- 
culture, underground culture, etc., as against the relatively limited symbolic 
genres of "tribal" society, and within each they allow lavish scope to 
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authors, poets, dramatists, painters, sculptors, composers, musicians, actors, 
comedians, folksingers, rock musicians, "makers" generally, to generate 
not only weird forms, but also, and not infrequently, models, direct and 
parabolic or aesopian, that are highly critical of the status quo as a whole 
or in part. Of course, given diversity as a principle, many artists, in many 
genres, also buttress, reinforce, and justify the prevailing social and culturaf 
mores and political orders. Those that do so, do  so in ways that tend more 
closely than the critical productions to parallel tribal myths and rituals- 
they are "liminal" or "pseudo-" or "post-" "liminal," rather than "liminoid." 
Satire is a conservative genre because it is pseudo-liminal. Satire exposes, 
attacks, or derides what it considers to be vices, follies, stupidities, or 
abuses, but its criteria of judgment are usually the normative structural 
frame of values. Hence satirical works, like those of Swift, Castlereagh, or 
Evelyn Waugh, often have a "ritual of reversal" form, indicating that dis- 
order is no permanent substitution for order. A mirror inverts but also 
reflects an object. It does not break it down into constituents in order to 
remold it, far less does it annihilate and replace that object. But art and 
literature often do. The liminal phases of tribal society invert but do not 
usually subvert the status quo, the structural form, of society; reversal 
underlines that chaos is the alternative to cosmos, so they had better stick 
to cosmos, that is, the traditional order of culture-though they can for a 
brief while have a heck of a good time being chaotic, in some saturnalian 
or lupercalian revelry, some charivari, or institutionalized orgy. But sup- 
posedly "entertainment" genres of industrial society are often subversive, 
lampooning, burlesquing, or subtly putting down the central values of the 
basic, work-sphere society, or at least of selected sectors of that society. 
Some of these genres, such as the "legitimate" or "classical" theater, are 
historically continuous with ritual, and possess something of the sacred 
seriousness, even the "rites de passage" structure of their antecedents. 
Nevertheless, crucial differences separate the structure, function, style, 
scope, and symbology of the liminal in "tribal and agrarian ritual and 
myth" from what we may perhaps call the "lirninoid," or leisure genres, of 
symbolic forms and action in complex, industrial societies, 
The term limen itself, the Latin for "threshold," selected by van Gennep 
to apply to "transition between," appears to be negative in connotation, 
since it is no longer the positive past condition nor yet the positive articu- 
lated future condition. It seems, too, to be passive since it is dependent on 
the articulated, positive conditions it mediates. Yet on probing, one finds 
in liminality both positive and active qualities, especially where that "thres- 
hold" is protracted and becomes a "tunnel," when the "liminal" becomes 
the "cunicular"; this is particularly the case in initiation rituals, with their 
long periods of seclusion and training of novices rich in the deployment of 
symbolic forms and esoteric teachings. "Meaning" in culture tends to be 
generated at the interfaces between established cultural sub-systems, though 
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meanings are then institutionalized and consolidated at the centers of such 
systems. Liminality is a temporal interface whose properties partially invert 
those of thealready consolidated order which constitutes any specific cultural 
"cosmos." It may be useful heuristically to  consider in relation to liminality 
in rituallmyth Durkheim's overall characterization of "mechanical soli- 
darity," which he regarded as that type of cohesion plus cooperative, collec- 
tive action directed towards the achievement of group goals which best 
applies to small, nonliterate societies with a simple division of labor and 
very little tolerance of individuality. He based this type of solidarity on a 
homogeneity of values and behavior, strong social constraint, and loyalty 
to tradition and kinship. The rules for togetherness are known and shared. 
Now what frequently typifies the liminality of initiation ritual in societies 
with mechanical solidarity is precisely the opposite of this: ordeals, myths, 
maskings, mumming, the presentation of sacred icons to novices, secret 
languages, food and behavioral taboos, create a weird domain in the seclu- 
sion camp in which ordinary regularities of kinship, the residential setting, 
tribal law and custom are set aside. The bizarre becomes the normal, and 
through the loosening of connections between elements customarily bound 
together in certain combinations, their scrambling and recombining in 
monstrous, fantastic, and unnatural shapes, the novices are induced to 
think (and think hard) about cultural experiences they had hitherto taken 
for granted. The novices are taught that they did not know what they thought 
they knew. Beneath the surface structure of custom was a deep structure, 
whose rules they had to learn, through paradox and shock. In some ways 
social constraints become stronger, even unnaturally and irrationally 
stronger, as when the novices are compelled by their elders to undertake 
what in their minds are unnecessary tasks by arbitrary fiat, and are pun- 
ished severely if they fail to  obey promptly-and, what is worse, even if 
they succeed. But in other ways, as in the case cited earlier from van Gennep's 
Rites de Passage, the novices also are conceded unprecedented freedoms: 
they make raids and swoops on villages and gardens, seize women, vituper- 
ate older people. Innumerable are the forms of topsy-turvydom, parody, 
abrogation of the normative system, exaggeration of rule into caricature 
or satirizing of rule. The novices are at once put outside and inside the 
circle of the previously known. But one thing must be kept in mind: all 
these acts and symbols are of obligation. Even the breaking of rules has to 
be done during initiation. This is one of the distinctive ways in which the 
liminal is marked off from the liminoid. In the 1972 American Anthropo- 
logical Association Meetings in Toronto, several examples were cited- 
among them, carnival in St. Vincent in the West Indies, and the La Have 
Islands, Nova Scotia (Abrahams and Bauman, 1972)-from modern so- 
cieties on the fringe of industrial civilizations which bore some resemblance 
to liminal inversions in tribal societies. But what was striking to me was 
how even in these "outback" regions optionality dominated the whole 
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process. For example, when the masked mummers of La Have, usually 
older boys and young married men, known as "belsnicklers," emerge on 
Christmas Eve to entertain, tease, and fool adults, and to frighten children, 
they knock at house doors and windows, asking to be "allowed" entrance. 
Some householders actually refuse to let them in. Now I cannot imagine 
a situation in which Ndembu, Luvale, Chokwe, or Luchazi masked dancers 
(peoples I have known and observed), who emerge after the performance 
of a certain ritual, marking the end of one half of the seclusion period and 
the beginning of another, to dance in villages and threaten women and 
children, would be refused entry. Nor do they ask permission to enter; they 
storm in! Belsnicklers have to "ask for" treats from householders. Makishi 
(maskers) among Ndembu, Chokwe, etc., demand food and gifts as of 
right. Optation pervades the liminoid phenomenon, obligation the liminal. 
One is all play and choice, an entertainment, the other is a matter of deep 
seriousness, even dread, it is demanding, compulsory (though, indeed, fear 
provokes nervous laughter from the women, who, if they are touched by 
the makishi, are believed to contract leprosy, become sterile, or go mad!). 
Again, in St. Vincent, only certain types of personalities are attracted to the 
Carnival as performers, those whom Roger Abrahams describes as "the 
rude and sporty segment of the community," who are "rude and sporty" 
whenever they have an opportunity to be so, all the year round-hence 
they can most aptly personify "disorder" versus "order" at the Carnival. 
Here, again, optation is evidently dominant-for people do not have to act 
invertedly, as in tribal rituals; some people, but not all people, choose to act 
invertedly at Carnival. And Carnival is unlike a tribal ritual in that it can 
be attended or  avoided, performed or merely watched, at will. It is a genre 
of leisure enjoyment, not an obligatory ritual, it is play-separated-from- 
work not play-and-work ludergy as a binary system of man's "serious" 
communal endeavor. Abrahams, in his joint paper with Bauman, makes 
a further valid point which firmly places Vincentian carnivals in the modern- 
leisure-genre category. He stresses that it is overwhelmingly the "bad, 
unruly (macho-type) men" who choose to perform carnival inversions 
indicative of disorder in the universe and society, people who are dis- 
orderly by temperament and choice in many extra-carnival situations. To 
the contrary, in tribal ritual, even the normally orderly, meek, and "law- 
abiding" people would be obliged to be disorderly in key rituals, regardless 
of their temperament and character. The sphere of the optional is in such 
societies much reduced. Even in liminality, where the bizarre behavior so 
often remarked upon by anthropologists occurs, the sacra, masks, etc., 
emerge to view under the guise a t  least of "collective representations." If 
there ever were individual creators and artists, they have been subdued by 
the general "liminal" emphasis on anonymity and normative communitas, 
just as the novices and their novice-masters have been. But in the liminoid 
genres of industrial art, literature, and even science (more truly homologous 
with tribal liminal thinking than modern art is), great public stress is laid on 
LIMINAL TO LIMINOID, IN PLAY, FLOW, AND RITUAL 75 
the individual innovator, the unique person who dares and opts to create. 
In this lack of stress on individuality, tribal liminality may be seen not as 
the inverse of tribal normativeness, but as its projection into ritual situa- 
tions. However, this has to be modified when one looks at actual initiation 
rituals "on the ground." 1 found that, among the Ndembu, despite the 
novices' being stripped of names, profane rank, and clothes, each emerged 
as a distinct individual; and there was an element of competitive personal 
distinctiveness in the fact that the best four novices in the terms of per- 
formance during seclusion (in hunting, endurance of ordeal, smartness in 
answering riddles, cooperativeness, etc.) were given titles in the rites marking 
their re-aggregation to profane society. For me, this indicated that in 
liminality is secreted the seed of the liminoid, waiting only for major 
changes in the sociocultural context to set it agrowing into the branched 
"candelabra" of manifold liminoid cultural genres. If one has to, like Jack 
Horner, pull out a dialectical plum from each and every type of social 
formation, I would counsel that those who propose to study one of the 
world's fast disappearing "tribal" societies should look at the liminal phases 
of their rituals in order most precisely to locate the incipient contradiction 
between communal-anonymous and private-distinctive modes of conceiving 
principles of sociocultural growth. 
I have used the term "anti-structure," mainly with reference to tribal 
and agrarian societies, to describe both liminality and what 1 have called 
"communitas." I meant by it not a structural reversal, a mirror-imaging of 
"profane" workaday socioeconomic structure, or a fantasy-rejection of 
structural "necessities," but the liberation of human capacities of cognition, 
affect, volition, creativity, etc., from the normative constraints incumbent 
upon occupying a sequence of social statuses, enacting a multiplicity of 
social roles, and being acutely conscious of membership in some corporate 
group such as a family, lineage, clan, tribe, or nation, or of affiliation with 
some pervasive social category such as a class, caste, sex- or age-division. 
Sociocultural systems drive so steadily towards consistency that human 
individuals only get off these normative hooks in rare situations in small- 
scale societies, and not very frequently in large-scale ones. Nevertheless, 
the exigencies of structuration itself, the process of containing new growth 
in orderly patterns or schemata, has an Achilles heel. This is the fact that 
when persons, groups, sets of ideas, etc., move from one level or style of 
organization or regulation of the interdependence of their parts or elements 
to another level, there has to  be an interfacial region or, to change the 
metaphor, an interval, however brief, of "margin" or "limen," when the 
past is momentarily negated, suspended, or abrogated, and the future has 
not yet begun. There is an instant of pure potentiality when everything 
trembles in the balance, like the moment when the trembling quarterback 
with all the "options" sees the very solid future moving menacingly towards 
him! In tribal societies, due to the general overriding homogeneity of 
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values, behavior, and social structural rules, this instant can be fairly easily 
contained or dominated by social structure, held in check from innovative 
excess, "hedged about," as anthropologists delight to  say, by "taboos," 
"checks and balances," and so on. Thus, the tribal liminal, however exotic 
in appearance, can never be much more than a subversive flicker. It is put 
into the service of normativeness almost as soon as it appears. Yet I see it. 
as a kind of institutional capsule or pocket which contains the germ of 
future social developments, of societal change, in a way that the central 
tendencies of a social system can never quite succeed in being, the spheres 
where law and custom, and the modes of social control ancillary to these, 
prevail. Innovation can take place in such spheres, but most frequently it 
occurs in interfaces and limina, then becomes legitimated in central sectors. 
For me, such relatively "late" social processes, historically speaking, as 
"revolution," "insurrection," and even "romanticism" in art, characterized 
by freedom in form and spirit, by emphasis on feeling and originality, 
represent an inversion of the relation between the normative and the liminal 
in "tribal" and other essentially conservative societies. For in these modern 
processes movements, the seeds of cultural transformation, discontent 
with the way things culturally are, and social criticism (always implicit 
in the preindustrially liminal), have become situationally central, no longer 
a matter of the interface between "fixed structures" but a matter of the 
holistically developmental. Thus revolutions, whether successful or not, 
become the limina, with all their initiatory overtones, between major 
distinctive structural forms or orderings of society. It may be that this is 
to use "liminal" in a metaphorical sense, not in the "primary" or "literal" 
sense advocated by van Gennep, but this usage may help us to think about 
global human society, to which all specific historical social formations 
may well be converging. Revolutions, whether violent or non-violent, may 
be the totalizing liminal phases for which the limina of tribal rites de 
passage were merely foreshadowings or premonitions. 
This may possibly be the point where we should feed in the other major 
variable of the "anti-structural," communitas. (1 will discuss the merits 
and demerits of talking about "anti-structure," "metastructure," and "pro- 
tostructure" later.) There is in tribal societies probably a closer relationship 
between communitas and liminality than between communitas and norm- 
ative structure, though the modality of human interrelatedness which is 
communitas can "play" across structural systems in a way too difficult for 
us at present to predict its motions. This is the experiential basis, 1 believe, 
of the Christian notion of "actual grace." Thus, in the workshop, village, 
office, lecture-room, theater, almost anywhere, people can be subverted 
from their duties and rights into an atmosphere of communitas. What then 
is communitas? Has it any reality base, or is it a persistent fantasy of man- 
kind, a sort of collective return to the womb? 1 have described (Turner 
1969) this way by which persons see, understand, and act towards one 
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another as essentially "an unmediated relationship between historical, 
idiosyncratic, concrete individuals." This is not the same as Georges Gur- 
vitch's notion of "communion" which he describes as "when minds open 
out as widely as possible and the least accessible depths of the '1' are inte- 
grated in this fusion (which presupposes states of collective ecstasy)" 
(Gurvitch 1941). For me communitas preserves individual distinctiveness 
-it is neither regression to infancy, nor is it emotional, nor is it "merging" 
in fantasy. In people's social structural relationships they are by various 
abstract processes generalized and segmentalized into roles, statuses, 
classes, cultural sexes, conventional agedivisions, ethnic affiliations, and 
so on. In different types of social situations they have been conditioned to 
play specific social roles. It does not matter how well or badly, as long as 
they "make like" they are obedient to the norm-sets that control different 
compartments of the complex model known as the "social structure." So 
far this has been almost the entire subject matter of the social sciences: 
people playing roles and maintaining or achieving status. Admittedly this 
does cover a very great deal of what human beings are up to and what 
quantitatively takes up a great deal of their available time, both in work 
and leisure. And, to some extent, the authentic human essence gets involved 
here, for every role-definition takes into account some basic human attribute 
or capacity, and willy-nilly, human beings p1a.v their roles in human ways. 
But full human capacity is locked out of these somewhat narrow, stuffy 
rooms. Even though when we say a person plays his role well, we often 
mean that he plays it with flexibility and imagination, Martin Buber's 
notions of I-and-Thou relationship and the Essential We formed by people 
moving towards a freely chosen common goal are intuitive perceptions of 
a non-transactional order or quality of human relationship, in the sense 
that people do  not necessarily initiate action towards one another in the 
expectation of a reaction that satisfies their interests. Anthropologists, 
inadvertently, have escaped many of these "hang-ups," for they deal with 
"man alive," in his altruistic as well as egoistic strivings, in the micro- 
processes of social life. Some sociologists, on the other hand, find security 
in ethnocentric questionnaires, which, by the nature of the case, distance 
observer from informant, and render inauthentic their subsequently guarded 
interaction. In tribal societies and other pre-industrial social formations, 
liminality provides a propitious setting for the development of these direct, 
immediate, and total confrontations of human identities. In industrial 
societies, it is within leisure, sometimes aided by the projections of art, that 
this way of experiencing one's fellows can be portrayed, grasped, and some- 
times realized. Liminality is, of course, an ambiguous state, for social struc- 
ture, while it inhibits full social satisfaction, gives a measure of finiteness 
and security; liminality may be for many the acme of insecurity, the break- 
through of chaos into cosmos, of disorder into order, rather than the milieu 
of creative interhuman or transhuman satisfactions and achievements. 
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Liminality may be the scene of disease, despair, death, suicide, the break- 
down without compensatory replacement of normative, well defined social 
ties and bonds. It may be anomie, alienation, angst, the three fatal "alpha" 
sisters of many modern myths. In tribal and similar societies it may be the 
interstitial domain of domestic witchcraft, the hostile dead, and the vengeful 
spirits of strangers; in the leisure genres of complex societies, it may be 
represented by the "extreme situations" beloved of existentialist writers: 
torture, murder, war, the verge of suicide, hospital tragedies, the point of 
execution, etc. Liminality is both more creative and more destructive than 
the structural norm. In either case it raises basic problems for social struc- 
tural man, invites him to speculation and criticism. But where it is socially 
positive it presents, directly or by implication, a model of human society 
as a homogeneous, unstructured communitas, whose boundaries are ideally 
coterminous with those of the human species. When even two people believe 
that they experience unity, all people are felt to be one by those two, even 
if only for a flash. Feeling generalizes more readily than thought, it would 
seem! The great difficulty is to keep this intuition alive-regular drugging 
will not do it, repeated sexual union will not do it, constant immersion in 
great literature will not do it: initiation seclusion must sooner or later come 
to an end. We thus encounter the paradox that the experience of communitas 
becomes the memory of communitas, with the result that communitas itself 
in striving to replicate itself historically develops a social structure, in which 
initially free and innovative relationships between individuals are converted 
into norm-governed relationships between social personae. I am aware 
that I am stating another paradox: that the more spontaneously "equal" 
people become, the more distinctively "themselves" they become; the more 
the same they become socially, the less they find themselves to be individu- 
ally. Yet when this communitas or comitas is institutionalized, the new- 
found idiosyncratic is legislated into yet another set of universalistic roles 
and statuses, whose incumbents must subordinate individuality to a rule. 
I argued in The Ritual Process that the spontaneity and immediacy of 
communitas-as opposed to the jural-political character of (social) struc- 
ture-can seldom be sustained for long. Communitas itself soon develops 
a (protective social) structure, in which free relationships between indi- 
viduals become converted into norm-governed relationships between 
social personae. The so-called "normal" may be more of a game, played in 
masks (personae), with a script, than certain ways of behaving "without a 
mask," that are culturally defined as "abnormal," "aberrant," "eccentric," 
or "way-out." Yet communitas does not represent the erasure of structural 
norms from the consciousness of those participating in it; rather its own 
style, in a given community, might be said to depend upon the way in which 
it symbolizes the abrogation, negation, or inversion of the normative 
structure in which its participants are quotidianly involved. Indeed, its own 
readiness to convert into normative structure indicates its vulnerability to 
the structural environment. 
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Looking at the historical fate of communitas, I identified three distinct 
and not necessarily sequential forms of it, which 1 called spontaneous, 
ideological, and normative. Each has certain relationships with liminal 
and liminoid phenomena. 
I )  Spontaneous communitas is "a direct, immediate and total confronta- 
tion of human identities," a deep rather than intense style of personal inter- 
action. "It has something 'magical' about it. Subjectively there is in it a 
feeling of endless power." Is there any of us who has not known this moment 
when compatible people-friends, congeners-obtain a flash of lucid 
mutual understanding on the existential level, when they feel that all prob- 
lems (not just their problems), whether emotional or cognitive, could be 
resolved, if only the group which is felt (in the first person) as "essentially 
us" could sustain its inter-subjective illumination. This illumination may 
succumb to the dry light of next day's disjunction, the application of singu- 
lar and personal reason to the "glory" of communal understanding. But 
when the mood, style, or "fit" of spontaneous communitas is upon us, we 
place a high value on personal honesty, openness, and lack of pretensions 
or pretentiousness. We feel that it is important to relate directly to another 
person as he presents himself in the here-and-now, to understand him in 
a sympathetic (not an empathetic-which implies some withholding, some 
non-giving of the self) way, free from the culturally defined encumbrances 
of his role, status, reputation, class, caste, sex, or other structural niche. 
Individuals who interact with one another in the mode of spontaneous 
communitas become totally absorbed into a single, synchronized, fluid 
event. Their "gut-" understanding of synchronicity in these situations opens 
them to the understanding of such cultural forms-derived typically today 
from the literate transmission of world culture, directly or in translation- 
as eucharistic union and the I-Ching. The latter stresses the mutual mystical 
participation (to cite LCvy-Bruhl) of all contemporary events, if one only 
had a mechanism to lay hold of the "meaning" underlying their "coinci- 
dence." 
2) What I have called "ideological cornmunitas" is a set of theoretical 
concepts which attempt to describe the interactions of spontaneous com- 
munitas. Here the retrospective look, "memory," has already distanced the 
individual subject from the communal or dyadic experience. Here the 
experiencer has already come to look to language and culture to mediate 
the former immediacies, an instance of what Mihali Csikszentmihalyi has 
recently called a "flow-break," that is, an interruption of that experience of 
merging action and awareness (and centering of attention) which charac- 
terizes the supreme "pay-off' in ritual, art, sport, games, and even gambling. 
"Flow" may induce communitas, and communitas "flow," but some "flows" 
are solitary and some modes of communitas separate awareness from 
action-especially in religious communitas. Here it is not teamwork in 
flow that is quintessential, but "being" together, with being the operative 
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word, not doing. Csikszentmihalyi has already begun to ransack the in- 
herited cultural past for models or for cultural elements drawn from the 
debris of past models from which he can construct a new model which will, 
however falteringly, replicate in words his concrete experience of spon- 
taneous communitas. Some of these sets of theoretical concepts can be 
expanded and concretized into a "utopian" model of society, in which all 
human activities would be carried out on the level of spontaneous com- 
munitas. I hasten to add that not all or even the majority of "utopian" 
models are those of "ideological communitas." Utopia means "no place" 
in Greek: the manufacture of utopias is an untrammelled "ludic" activity 
of the leisure of the modern world, and such manufacture, like industrial 
manufacture, tends to posit ideal politico-administrative structures as prime 
desiderata-including highly hierarchical ones-rather than what the world 
or a land or island would look like if everyone sought to live in communitas 
with his and her neighbor. There are many hierarchical utopias, conserva- 
tive utopias, fascistic utopias. Nevertheless, the communitas "utopia" is 
found in variant forms as a central ingredient, connected with the notion 
of "salvation," in many of the world's literate, "historical" religions. "Thy 
Kingdom" (which being cariras, agape, "love," is an anti-kingdom, a com- 
munitas) "come." 
3 )  Normative communiras, finally, is, once more, a "perduring social 
system," a subculture or group which attempts to foster and maintain rela- 
tionships of spontaneous communitas on a more or less permanent basis. 
To do  this it has to denature itself, for spontaneous communitas is more a 
matter of "grace" than "law," to use theological language. Its spirit "bloweth 
where it listethW-it cannot be legislated for or normated, since it is the 
exception, not the law, the miracle not the regularity, primordial freedom 
not anangke, the causal chain of necessity. But, nevertheless, there is 
something about the origin of a group based even on normative communitas 
which distinguishes it from groups which arise on the foundation of some 
"natural" or technical "necessity," real or imagined, such as a system of 
productive relations or a group of putatively biologically connected per- 
sons, a family, kindred, or lineage. Something of "freedom," liberation," or 
''love'' (to use terms common in theological or political-philosophical 
Western vocabularies) adheres to  normative communitas, even although 
quite often the strictest regimes devolve from what are apparently the most 
spontaneous experiences of communitas. This rigor comes about from the 
fact that communitas groups feel themselves initially to be utterly vulnerable 
to the institutionalized groups surrounding them. They develop protective 
institutional armor, armor which becomes the harder as the pressures to 
destroy the primary group's autonomy proportionally increase. They "be- 
come what they behold." On the other hand, if they did not "behold" their 
enemies, they would succumb to them. This dilemma is presumably not 
resoluble by a growing, changing, innovative species which invents new 
LIMINAL TO LIMINOID, IN PLAY, FLOW, AND RITUAL 8 1 
tools of thinking as well as of industry and explores new emotional styles 
as it proceeds through time. The opposition of the old may be as important 
for change as the innovativeness of the new, inasmuch as together they 
constitute a problem. 
Groups based on normative communitas commonly arise during a period 
of religious revival. When normative communitas is demonstrably a group's 
dominant social mode one can witness the process of transformation of a 
charismatic and personal movement into an ongoing, relatively repetitive 
social system. The inherent contradictions between spontaneous commu- 
nitas and a markedly structured system are so great, however, that any 
venture which attempts to combine these modalities will constantly be 
threatened by structural cleavage or by the suffocation of communitas. The 
typical compromise here-and I refer the reader to  The Ritual Process, 
Ch. 4, for illustrative case histories-tends to be a splitting of the nember- 
ship into opposed factions, a solution which endures only as long as a 
balance of power is maintained between them. Usually the group which 
first organizes, then structures ifself most methodically, prevails politically 
or parapolitically, though the key communitas values shared by both groups 
but put into abeyance by the politically successful one may later become 
resurgent in the latter. Thus the Conventual Franciscans succeeded in 
getting the Spiritual Franciscans condemned for their usus pauper, or 
extreme view of poverty, but the Capuchin Reform, beginning about three 
centuries later in 1525, restored many of the primitive ideals of Franciscan 
poverty and simplicity, which were practiced before the split into Conven- 
tuals and Spirituals in the thirteenth century. In symbological terms we have 
to distinguish between symbols of politico-jural systems and those making 
up religious systems. Usus pauper was a political symbol marking the fac- 
tional cleavage between the two wings of Franciscanism, while "My Lady 
Povertyw-itself perhaps a Franciscan variant on the themes of "Our Lady 
Mary" or of "Our Holy Mother the Church" was a cultural symbol, tran- 
scending political structural divisions. Communitas tends to generate meta- 
phors and symbols which later fractionate into sets and arrays of cultural 
values; it is in the realms of physical life-support (economics) and social 
control (law, politics) that symbols acquire their "social-structural" charac- 
ter. But, of course, the cultural and social-structural realms interpenetrate 
and overlap as concrete individuals pursue their interests, seek to attain 
their ideals, love, hate, subdue, and obey one another, in the flux of history. 
I will not advance at this point the view that the "extended-case method," 
with the social drama as one of its techniques, offers a useful way of study- 
ing symbols and their meanings as events within the total flow of social 
events, for I am still concerned with the problem of the relationships be- 
tween symbols, the liminal, the liminoid, communitas, and social structure. 
Communitas exists in a kind of "figure-ground" relationship with social 
structure. The boundaries of each of these-insofar as they constitute 
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explicit or implicit models for human interaction-are defined by contact 
or comparison with the other. In the same way, the liminal phase of an 
initiation rite is defined by the surrounding social statuses (many of which 
it abrogates, inverts, or invalidates), and the "sacred" is defined by its 
relation to the "profanew-even in a single culture there is much relativity 
here, for if A is "sacred" to B, he may be simultaneously "profane" to C ,  
and "less sacred" to D. Situational selection prevails here, as in many 
other aspects of sociocultural process. Communitas, in the present context 
of its use, then, may be said to exist more in contrast than in active oppo- 
sition to social structure, as an alternative and more "liberated" way of 
being socially human, a way both of being detached from social structure 
(and hence potentially of periodically evaluating its performance) and also 
of a "distanced" or "marginal" person's being more attached to other dis- 
engaged persons (and hence, sometimes of evaluating a social structure's 
historical performance in common with them). Here we may have a loving 
union of the structurally damned pronouncing judgment on normative 
structure and providing alternative models for structure. 
The boundaries of the astructural model of human interconnectedness 
described by ideological comrnunitas are "ideally coterminous with those 
of the human species" (and sometimes extend even beyond that to a generic 
"reverence for life"). Therefore, those who are experiencing, or have re- 
cently experienced communitas often attempt to convert a social structural 
interaction or a set of such interactions (involving the primacy of institu- 
tionalized status-role behavior over "freewheeling" behavior) into a direct, 
immediate and total confrontation of human identities, that is, into spon- 
taneous communitas. Communitas tends to be inclusive (some might call 
it "generous"), social structure tends to be exclusive, even snobbish, relish- 
ing the distinction between we/ they or in-group/ out-group, higher/ lower, 
betterslmenials. This drive to inclusivity makes for proselytization. One 
wants to make the Others, We. One famous case in the Western tradition 
is Pentecost, when people of different linguistic and ethnic groups claimed, 
under the inspiration of the Holy Ghost, to understand one another com- 
pletely sub- or trans-linguistically. After that the Pentecostal throng went 
forth to missionize the world. The glossolalia of some modern Pentecostals 
appears to be connected with the notion that whereas articulate speech 
divides people of different linguistic groups and even expedites "sin," 
among those of the same speech community, nonsense (archaic) speech 
facilitates mutual love and virtue. But these conversion attempts by com- 
munitarian individuals may be interpreted not only by the power elites of 
social structure, but also by the rank and file who feel safe in their obedience 
to norm, as a direct threat to their own authority or safety, and perhaps 
especially to their institution-based social identities. Thus the expansive 
tendencies of communitas may touch off a repressive campaign by the 
structurally entrenched elements of society, which leads in turn to more 
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active, even militant opposition by the communitarians (cf. here the his- 
torical process set in train by many miflenarian or revitalistic movements); 
and so on, in an ever spiraling struggle between the forces of structure and 
the powers of communitas. The struggle is rather like what Frye and David 
Erdman-drawing on Blake's symbols-have called the Orc-Urizen cycle. 
"Orc" here represents revolutionary energy and "Urizen" the "law-maker 
and the avenging conscience" (S. Foster Damon); the cycle itself is a partial 
anticipation of Pareto's "circulation of elites," the "lionv-like revolutionary 
elites being succeeded by the "foxv-like strategists and tacticians of power 
maintenance. 
In spite of-and, to a considerable extent, because of-this conflict, 
communitas serves important functions for the larger, structured, centristic 
society. In The Ritual Process 1 noted that 
Liminality, marginality, and structural inferior~ty are condit~ons in wh~ch are frequently 
generated myths, symbols, rituals, ph~losoph~cal  systems, and works of art. These cuttural 
forms provide men with a set of templates, models, o r  paradigms which are, at one level, 
periodical reclassifications of real~ty (or, a t  least, of social experience) and man's relat~on- 
ship to  society, nature, and culture. But they are more than (mere cognit~ve) class~fica- 
tions,since they incite men to  actlon as wellas thought. (1969: 128- 129) 
When I wrote this, I had not yet made the distinction between ergic-ludic 
ritual liminality and anergic-ludic liminoid genres of action and literature. 
In tribal societies, liminality is often functional, in the sense of being a 
special duty or  performance required in the course of work or activity; its 
very reversals and inversions tend to compensate for rigidities or unfair- 
nesses of normative structure. But in industrial society, the rire de passage 
form, built into the calendar and/or  modeled on organic processes of ma- 
turation and decay, no longer suffices for total societies. Leisure provides 
the opportunity for a multiplicity of optional, liminoid genres of literature, 
drama, and sport, which are not conceived of as "antistructure" to norma- 
tive structure where "antistructure is an auxiliary function of the larger 
structure" (Sutton-Smith 1972:17). Rather are they to be seen as Sutton- 
Smith envisages "play," as "experimentation with variable repertoires," 
consistent with the manifold variation made possible by developed tech- 
nology and an advanced stage of the division of labor (1972:18). The 
liminoid genres, to adapt Sutton-Smith (he was referring to "anti-structure," 
a term he borrowed from me, but he claimed that I used it in a system- 
maintenance sense only), 
not only make tolerable the system as it exists, they keep its members in a more flexible 
state with respect to that system, and, therefore, with respect to possible change. Each 
system [Sutton-Smith goes on] has structural and anti-structural adaptive functions. The 
normative structure represents the working equilibrium, the ant[-structure represents the 
latent system of potential alternatives from whtch novelty will arise when contkngencies In 
the normative system require it.. . . We might more cor~.ectly call this second sysrem the 
prolo-struc~ural system because it is the precursor of innovative normative forms. I t  is 
thesourceofnew culture. (1972:18- 19) 
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In the so-called "high culture" of complex societies, the liminoid is not 
only removed from a rite de passage context, it is also "individualized." 
The solitary artist creates the liminoid phenomena, the collectivity experi- 
ences collective liminal symbols. This does not mean that the maker of 
liminoid symbols, ideas, images, and so on, does so ex nihilo; it only means 
that he is privileged to make free with his social heritage in a way impossible 
to members of cultures in which the liminal is to a large extent the sacrosanct. 
When we compare liminal with liminoid processes and phenomena, then, 
we find crucial differences as well as similarities. Let me try to  set some of 
these out. In a crude, preliminary way they provide some delimitation of 
the field of comparative symbology. 
1 )  Liminalphenomena tend to predominate in tribal and early agrarian 
societies possessing what Durkheim has called "mechanical solidarity," 
and dominated by what Henry Maine has called "status." Liminoid phe- 
nomena flourish in societies with "organic solidarity," bonded reciprocally 
by "contractual" relations, and generated by and following the industrial 
revolution. They perhaps begin to appear on the scene in city-states on their 
way to becoming empires (of the Graeco-Roman type) and in feudal societies 
(including not only the European sub-types found between the tenth and 
fourteenth centuries in France, England, Flanders, and Germany, but also 
the far less "pluralistic" Japanese, Chinese, and Russian types of feudalism, 
or quasi-feudalism). But they first begin clearly to develop in Western 
Europe in nascent capitalist societies, with the beginnings of industrializa- 
tion and mechanization, the transformation of labor into a commodity, and 
the appearance of real social classes. The heyday of this type of nascent 
industrial society was in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries-climaxing 
in the "age of enlightenment." It had begun to appear in Western Europe in 
the second half of the sixteenth century, particularly in England, where, a 
little later, Francis Bacon published his Novum Organum in 1620, a work 
which definitely linked scientific with technical knowledge. Liminoid phe- 
nomena continued to characterize the democratic-liberal societies which 
dominated Europe and America in the nineteenth and early twentieth cen- 
turies. These societies were characterized by universal suffrage, the pre- 
dominance of legislative over executive power, parliamentarianism, a 
plurality of political parties, freedom of workers and employers to  organize, 
freedom of joint stock companies, trusts, and cartels to organize, and the 
separation of church and state. Liminoid phenomena are still highly visible 
in the post-World War Two managerial societies of organized capitalism 
of the modern United States, Western Germany, France, Britain, Italy, 
Japan, and other countries of the Western bloc. Here the economy no 
longer is left even ostensibly to "free competition," but is planned both by 
the state itself-usually in the interests of the reigning industrial and finan- 
cial upper middle classes-and by private trusts and cartels (national and 
international), often with the support of the state, which puts its consider- 
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able bureaucratic administrative machinery in their service. Nor are liminoid 
phenomena absent from the systems of centralized state collectivism ex- 
emplified by Russia and China, following their revolutions, and by the 
"people's democracies" of Eastern Europe (with the exception of Yugo- 
slavia, which has been moving in the direction of decentralized collectivism). 
Here the new culture tries to synthesize, as far as possible, humanism and 
technology-not the easiest of tasks-substituting for natural rhythms the 
logic of technological processes, while attempting to divest these of their 
socially exploitative character and proposing them to be generated and 
sustained by the "popular genius." This, however, with collectivism, tends 
to reduce the potentially limitless freedom of liminoid genres to the produc- 
tion of forms congenial to the goal of integrating humanism (in the sense of 
a modern, nontheistic, rationalistic viewpoint that holds that man is capable 
ofself-fulfillment, ethical conduct, etc., without recourse to supernaturalism) 
and technology. 
2) Liminalphenomena tend to be collective, concerned with calendrical, 
biological, social-structural rhythms or with crises in social processes 
whether these result from internal adjustments or external adaptations or 
remedial measures. Thus they appear at what may be called "natural breaks," 
natural disjunctions in the flow of natural and social processes. They are 
thus enforced by sociocultural "necessity," but they contain in nuce "free- 
dom" and the potentiality for the formation of new ideas, symbols, models, 
beliefs. Liminoidphenomena may be collective (and when they are so are 
often directly derived from liminal antecedents), but are more character- 
istically individual products, though they often have collective or "mass'' 
effects. They are not cyclical, but continuously generated, though in the 
times and places apart from work settings assigned to "leisure" activities. 
3) Liminal phenomena are centrally integrated into the total social 
process, forming with all its other aspects a complete whole, and repre- 
senting its necessary negativity and subjunctivity. Liminoid phenomena 
develop apart from the central economic and political processes, along the 
margins, in the interfaces and interstices of central and servicing institu- 
tions-they are plural, fragmentary, and experimental in character. 
4)  Liminal phenomena tend to confront investigators rather after the 
manner of Durkheim's "collective representations," symbols having a com- 
mon intellectual and emotional meaning for all the members of a given 
group. They reflect, on probing, the history of the group, i.e., its colIective 
experience, over time. They differ from preliminal or postliminal collective 
representations in that they are often reversals, inversions, disguises, nega- 
tions, antitheses of quotidian, "positive," or "profane" collective represen- 
tations. But they share their mass, collective character. 
Liminoid phenomena tend to be more idiosyncratic or quirky, to be 
generated by specific named individuals and in particular groups-"schools," 
circles, and coteries. They have to compete with one another for general 
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recognition and are thought of at first as ludic offerings placed for sale on 
the "free" market-this is at least true of liminoid phenomena in nascent 
capitalistic and democratic-liberal societies. Their symbols are closer t o  the 
personal-psychological than to the "objective-social" typological pole. 
5) Liminal phenomena tend to be ultimately eufunctional even when 
seemingly "inversive" for the working of the social structure, ways of 
making it work without too much friction. 
Liminoidphenomena, on the other hand, are often parts of social critiques 
or even revolutionary manifestoes-books, plays, paintings, films, etc,, 
exposing the injustices, inefficiencies, and immoralities of the mainstream 
economic and political structures and organizations. 
In complex modern societies both types coexist in a sort of cultural 
pluralism. But the liminal-found in the activities of churches, sects, and 
movements, in the initiation rites of clubs, fraternities, masonic orders and 
other secret societies, etc.-is no longer society-wide. Nor are liminoid 
phenomena, which tend to be the leisure genres of art, sport, pastimes, 
games, etc., practiced by and for particular groups, categories, segments, 
and sectors of large-scale industrial societies of all types. But for most 
people the liminoid is still felt to be freer than the liminal, a matter of 
choice not obligation. The liminoid is more like a commodity-indeed, 
often is a commodity, which one selects and pays for-than the lirninal, 
which elicits loyalty and is bound up with one's membership or  desired 
membership in some highly corporate group. One works at the liminal, 
one plays with the liminoid. There may be much moral pressure to go to 
church or synagogue, whereas one queues up at the boxoffice to see a play 
by Beckett, a performance by Mort Sahl, a Superbowl Game, a symphony 
concert, or an art exhibition. And if one plays golf, goes yachting, or climbs 
mountains, one often needs to buy expensive equipment or pay for club 
membership. Of course, there are also all kinds of "free" liminoid perform- 
ances and entertainments-Mardi Gras, charivari, home entertainments of 
various kinds-but these already have something of the stamp of the 
liminal upon them, and quite often they are the cultural debris of some 
unforgotten liminal ritual. There are permanent "liminoid" settings and 
spaces, too-bars, pubs, some cafks, social clubs, etc. But when clubs be- 
come exclusivist they tend to generate rites of passage, with the liminal a 
condition of entrance into the "liminoid'?ealm. 
I am frankly in an exploratory phase just now. 1 hope to  make more 
precise these crude, almost medieval maps I have been unrolling of the 
obscure liminal and liminoid regions which lie around our comfortable 
village of the sociologically known, proven, tried and tested. Discussing 
both "liminal" and "liminoid" requires studying symbols in social action, 
in praxis, not entirely at a safe remove from the full human condition. It 
means studying all domains of expressive culture, not the high culture 
alone nor the popular culture alone, the literate or the nonliterate, the 
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Great or the Little Tradition, the urban or the rural. Comparative sym- 
bology must learn how to "embrace multitudes" and generate sound intel- 
lectual progeny from that embrace. It must study total social phenomena. 
I would like to conclude by considering some of the relationships between 
communiras, "flow," the liminal, and the liminoid. Let me briefly try to 
explain what Mihali Csikszentmihalyi and my friend John McAloon 
mean by "flowing." "Flow denotes the holistic sensation present when we 
act with total involvement," is "a state in which action follows action ac- 
cording to an internal logic which seems to need no conscious intervention 
on our part. . . . we experience it as a unified flowing from one moment 
to the next, in which we feel in control of our actions, and in which there 
is little distinction between self and environment; between stimulus and 
response; or between past, present, and future" (Csikszentmihalyi 1972). 
Some recent research by Callois, Unsworth, Abrahams, and Murphy (and 
by McAloon and Csikszentmihalyi) has focused on various forms of play 
and sport (liminoid metagenres of our society) such as mountaineering, 
rock-climbing, soccer, hockey, chess, long distance swimming, handball, 
etc., in which the state of flow can be experienced. McAloon and Csik- 
szentmihalyi extend their notion of "flow" beyond play to "the creative 
experience" in art and literature, and to religious experiences, drawing on 
many scientific and literary sources. They locate six "elements" or "quali- 
ties" or "distinctive features" of the "flow experience." These are: 
1) The experience of merging action and awareness: there is no dualism 
in "flow"; while an actor may be aware of what he is doing, he cannot be 
aware that he is aware-if he is, there is a rhythmic behavioral or cognitive 
break-self-consciousness makes him stumble, and "flow," perceived 
from the "outside" becomes non-"flow" or anti-"flow." Pleasure gives way 
to problem, to worry, to anxiety. 
2) This merging of action and awareness is made possible by a centering 
of attention on a limited stimulus field. Consciousness must be narrowed, 
intensified, beamed in on a limited focus of attention. "Past and future 
must be given up"-only now matters. How is this to be done? Here the 
conditions that normally prevail must be "simplified" by some definition 
of situational relevance. What is irrelevant must be excluded. Physiological 
means to simplify experience are drugs (including alcohol) which do not 
so much "expand" consciousness as limit and intensify awareness. lntensi- 
fication is the name of the game. In games this is done by formal rules and 
by such morivational means as, for example, competitiveness. A game's 
rules dismiss as irrelevant most of the "noise" which makes up social 
reality, the multiform stimuli which impinge on our consciousness. We 
have to abide by a limited set of norms. Then we are motivated to do well 
by the game's intrinsic structure, often to do better than others who sub- 
scribe to the same rules. Our minds and our wills are thus disencumbered 
from irrelevances and sharply focused in certain known directions. Rewards 
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for good knowledge and invincible wilI, when harnessed to tactical techni- 
cal skill, complete the focusing. But for our authors the flow's the thing, 
not the rules, motivations, or rewards. This involves "inner resources" too, 
the "will to participate" (which like all liminoid phenomena goes back to 
voluntariness; one opts to play), the capacity to shift emphases among the 
structural components of a game or to innovate by using the rules to 
generate unprecedented performances. But it is the limitation by rules and 
motive, the centering of attention, which encourages the flow experience. 
3) Loss of ego is another "flow" attribute. The "self' which is normally 
the "broker" between one person's actions and another's, simply becomes 
irrelevant. The actor is immersed in the "flow," he accepts the rules as 
binding which are also binding on the other actors-no self is needed to 
"bargain" about what should or should not be done. The rules ensure the 
reduction of deviance or eccentricity in much of manifest behavior. Reality 
terids to be "simplified to the point that is understandable, definable, and 
manageable" (Csikszentmihalyi 1972:ll). This holds good, Csikszent- 
mihalyi says, for "religious ritual, artistic performance, games." SeIf- 
forgetfulness here does not mean loss of self-awareness. Kinesthetic and 
mental awareness is indeed heightened, not reduced; but its full effect 
comes when flow is recollected later "in tranquility." If flow itself is 
broken, as we have seen, the special kind of awareness of self intrinsic to it 
is lost. Again, there is no solipsism, mere autism, about the experience. 
Flow reaches out to nature and to other men in what Csikszentmihalyi 
calls "intuitions of unity, solidarity, repletion and acceptance"; all men, 
even all things, are felt to be one, subjectively, in the flow experience. 
Much evidence is brought forward to support this; LCvy-Bruhl's "partici- 
pation mystique" and Suzuki's "non-dualistic (Zen) experience" are cited, 
as are the comments of athletes and sportsmen. 
4) A person "in flow" finds himself "in conrrol of his actions and o f t h e  
environment." He may not know this at the time of "flow," but reflecting 
on it he may realize that his skilIs were matched to the demands made on 
him by ritual, art, or sport. This helps him to "build a positive self-concept" 
(p. 13). Outside "flow," such a subjective sense of control is difficult to 
attain, due to the multiplicity of stimuli and cultural tasks-especially, I 
would hold, in industrial societies, with their complex social and technical 
division of labor. But in the ritualized limits of a game or the writing of a 
poem, a person may cope, if he rises to the occasion with skill and tact. 
With control, worry goes, and fear. Even, as in rock climbing, when the 
dangers are real, the moment flow begins and the activity is entered, the 
flow "delights" outweigh the sense of dangers and problems. 
5 )  "Flow" usually "contains coherent, non-contradictory demands jur 
action, and provides clear, unambiguous .feedback to a person's actions. 
This is entailed by the limiting of awareness to a restricted field of possi- 
bilities. Culture reduces the flow possibility to defined channels-chess, 
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polo, gambling, liturgical action, miniature painting, a yoga exercise, etc. 
You can "throw yourself' into the cultural design of the game or art, and 
know whether you have done well o r  not when you have finished the 
round of culturally predetermined acts-in the extreme case, if you survive 
you have performed adequately-in other cases, the public or the critics 
have an important say, but if you are a real "pro," the final judge is your- 
self, looking back. Flow differs from everyday in that it contains explicit 
rules "which make action and the evaluation of action unproblematic" 
(p. 15). Thus, cheating breaks flow-you have to  be a believer, even if this 
means temporary "willing suspension of unbelief," i.e., choosing (in 
liminoid fashion) to believe that the rules areGbtrue." 
6) Finafly "flow" is "autotelic," i.e., it seems to need no goals or rewards 
outside itself: To flow is to  be as happy as a human can be-the particular 
rules or stimuli that triggered the flow, whether chess or a prayer meeting, 
do not matter. This is important for any study of human behavior, if true, 
for it suggests that people will culturally manufacture situations which 
will release flow, or individually seek it outside their ascribed stations in 
life if these are "flow-resistant." 
Csikszentmihalyi goes on to link "flow theory" with information theory 
and competence theory-but I am not convinced by these speculations. 
1 think he has superbly pinpointed and ascribed qualities to this experience 
-which has to be dealt with phenomenologically in the first place (though 
we may be able to get more "objective" later with EEG patterns, changes 
in metabolic rates, etc.). 
1 would like to say simply that what 1 call communitas has something of 
a "flow" quality, but it may arise, and often does arise, spontaneously and 
unanticipated-it does not need rules to trigger it off. In theological 
language it is sometimes a matter of "grace" rather than "law." Again, 
"flow" is experienced within an individual, whereas communitas at its 
inception is evidently between or among individuals-it is what all of us 
believe we share and its outputs emerge from dialogue, using both words 
and non-verbal means of communication, such as understanding smiles, 
jerks of the head, and so on, between us. "Flow" for me is already in the 
domain of what I have called "structure"; communitas is always pre- 
structural, even though those who participate in it have been saturated in 
structure-being human-since they were infants. But "flow," for me, 
seems to be one of the ways in which "structure" may be transformed or  
"liquefied" (like the famed martyr's blood) into communitas again. It is 
one of the techniques whereby people seek the lost "kingdom" or "anti- 
kingdom" of direct, unmediated communion with one another, even 
though severe subscription to rules is the frame in which this communion 
may possibly be induced (the "mantric" frame, one might say). 
In societies before the Industrial Revolution, ritual could always have 
a "flow" quality for total communities (tribes, moieties, clans, lineages, 
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families, etc.); in post-Industrial societies, when ritual gave way to indi- 
vidualism and rationalism, the flow experience was pushed mainly into 
the leisure genres of art, sport, games, pastimes, etc. Since work was 
complex and diversified, its pleasurable, optational equivalent, palliative, 
or medicine, the domain of leisure genres, also became complex and diversi- 
fied. However, it was often inversive of the work domain in form if not in 
function-since the function of many games is to reinforce the mental 
paradigms we all carry in our heads which motivate us to  carry out ener- 
getically the tasks our culture defines as belonging to the "work" sphere. 
The point here is that ritual (including its liminal phase) in archaic, 
theocratico-charismatic, patriarchal, and feudal societies (even a little in 
city-states becoming empires) and certain ancillary institutions such as 
religious drama provided the main cultural flow-mechanisms and patterns. 
But in those ages in which the sphere of religious ritual has contracted (as 
Durkheim puts it), a multiplicity of (theoretically) non-serious, non- 
earnest genres, such as art and sport (though these may be more serious 
than the Protestant ethic has defined them to be), have largely taken over 
the flow-function in culture. Communitas is something else, for it does 
not have to be induced by rules-it can happen anywhere, often in despite 
of rules. It is more like the "Witness" in Hindu thought which can only 
watch and love, but cannot act (i.e., cannot "flow" in games terms) without 
changing its nature. 
One final point: I have left out both from communitas and "flow" an 
essential feature-the content of the experience. This is where the analysis 
of symbols begins-the symbols of chess, of Impressionist art, of Buddhist 
meditation, of Christian Marian pilgrimage, of scientific research, of formal 
Iogic, have different meanings, different semantic contents. Surely, the 
processes of communitas and flow are imbued with the meanings of the 
symbols they either generate or are channeled by. Are all "flows" one and 
do the symbols indicate different kinds and depths of flow? 
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